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FILED 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
DOCKET NO. I | W <=- » COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
_ _ „ - - - -00000O00000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
RICHARD S. SWART PETITION FOR A RE-HEARING 
Petitioner - Appellant v Case No. 9^0621-CA 
0* LANE McCOTTER, Director v 
Utah Department of Corrections 
Respondent - Appelles 
~ - m & & 3 &&>&** &*sa&*>~ - » « • « . - -OOOOOOOOOOO • • - — - - - - - - « - -
The Petitioner above named, RICHARD S. SWART, respectfully Petitions The Captioned 
Court for i t s GREER - GRANTING A RB-HEARING upon The grounds hereinafter respectfully 
presented* 
STATEMENT OF JUBISBICTIOH 
The Petitioner respectfully submits that The Captioned Court i s invested with 
Jurisdiction to entertain The Instant Petition and to grant the re l ie f that i s being 
respectfully sought, consistent with the following provisions of HOLB 35. RULES OF TH8 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS! 
Rule 35. Petition for rehearing. 
(a) Time for filing; contents; answer; oral argument not permitted. A 
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a petition for rehearing. A 
matter may not be reheard by the court en banc. A petition for rehearing may 
be filed with the clerk within 14days after the entry of tfee decision ofthe 
gourt Q^AjDpeals, unless the tTme^fe'sHoriened^oT enlarged by order." TThe*^  
petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which the 
petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended and shall con-
tain such argument in support of the petition as the petitioner so desires. 
Counsel for the petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be 
permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be received unless re-
quested by the court. 
as to questions concerning material issues of 
fact, "[a]ffidavits and depositions submitted in 
support of and m opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment may be used only to 
determine whether a material issue of fact exists, 
not to determine whether one party's case is less 
persuasive than another's or is not likely to 
succeed in a trial on the merits." Id. 
Accordingly, "[bjecause this is an appeal from 
a summary judgment, we review the factual 
submissions to the trial court in a light most 
favorable to fmding a material issue of fact." 
Vershds v. Guaranty Nat'I Cos., 842 P. 2d 865, 
867 (Utah 1992) (citing King v. Searle 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 
1992)). "Agenuine issue of fact exists where, 
on the jS^is^^oT^Jhe^facts roTEe record, 
reasonable_mmds could^difYer" on^anY~n^aj£rial 
Issue. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 
(Utah 1982). 
Cf• HON SHSPHBIP INSURANCE Co.. V. MAYH*. 251 Btah AAv, 
Hep.f (Sup.fCtw, 199*0 
FUrtTHM. The United States Supreme Court la one of Its RECENT P80H0UNGSMBNTS 
RELATIVE TO A SUMMARY JPBGBHENT »*de the folleving STATEMENT! 
A party that moves for summary judg-
ment bears the burden to establish that its 
opponent failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
All U.S. 317, 323, 10G S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the crucial issue is 
one on which the movant will bear the 
ultimate burden of proof at trial, then the 
ANS CGNSISTUT WIT* THE ABOVE UNITES STATES DIRECTIVE TMATi 
" THE MOVANT CAN SATISFY MIS SUMMABY JUDGMENT 
BWIBBN BY SUBMITTING EVIMB1TIARY DOCtWBNtt 
THAT ESTABLISH ALL OP THE EUMBNTS OF THE" 
CLAIM OR 
ACCatfiXXGir* The P e t t t t e M * reeeeet f t tUy mfc t i t e the £ol lewln* EXCttFT fee* 
The * a s * o*r«JMnWMr^^ 
Renorable J. TMOHAJI GKffilB, Halted S*»t«*~31»tgle» gV^oV\?*4g» AStSPTE^ THE 
- STIPULATION - o f ( F e n e r ) WARAfTGRMBf CDBBUL < BAVIB L. MILKIIO0ItESQ##) And 
yareueat therete
 # # «JtHLB» AS FOLLOW i 
/ O rmrrrrm*rr\*i P/M> a p U P A P T M / ^ _ OtfADT M M^nrwrnum TV* ± \ 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
THE STATUTE 
The underlined portion of the Utah stat-
ute under scrutiny here, excluding the por-
tion this court has already upheld as en-
forceable and not unconstitutional, is as 
follows: 
Sexual activity means . . . any touching 
of a person's clothed or unclothed geni-
tal^ pubic areiL__bijttocks,_flnus> ori 'f tf|g 
P£rJll? rL'3 n ^ .1" a I e, he r__b_re a st, v. he the r 
llLn'1!L o r. bet woe n m nijhn rs__o f the s a me 
or opposite scxL_or bctv* een humani and 
anima hj, in an actoT_app&££])_t_or _actual 
s e x u a 1 stimulation or gratification. 
§ 76-10-1301(1). 
This court now holds that the underlined 
portion of the statute violates the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution in two 
particulars, i e that it is overbroad, and 
that it is impermissibly vague* 
THUS, i t would i ? | » r that Ths Petit ioner's CHALLMSGB OP THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THB ACT OF " TOUCHING » ( Of whieh specif ic ACT Ths Petitioner was convieisd ) , 
places A » QUESTION OF MATERIAL FACE ...CLEARLY UPON THS FACS OF THS RSCOBB and 
thereby PRSCLUBBB Ths Trial Court froa Issuing A SUMMARY DI3P0SITI0M in ths instant 
e a s s . . . especially whsn such fas t Is riewediin conjunction with ths following 
Statement of STANDING* by Ths Supreme Court in i t s following ruling! 
(3, 4J Although a guilty ]>lca waives all 
non jurisdictional defects and fact issues, a 
vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional defect. 
Thus, "following a guilty plea, a defendant 
could raise on appeal that ho was piosccutcd 
under an unconstitutional sfatule. Mack-
Inhjr'vTe'mi. All U.S. 21, 91 S.Gt. 21)98, 40 
L.Ed 2d 628 (1974). 
II . 
IT SHOULD BB ESPECIALLY NOTES AT THIS POINT THAT IN THS CASS OF BRUCE MATHEWS V 
M. ELDON BARNSS. Wardsa. Cass No. 890298-CA, THIS COURT EXPRESSLY DECLINES TO AFPR0V3 
THB HERS PLACEMENT OF - F R I ? 0 L 0 U S " UPON THE HABEAS PETITION OF MATHEWS AND 
" REVERSES AND REMANDED ""THS"siJMMA!Cf"DISMISSAL OF MATHEWS' HABEAS PETITION BY JUSGB 
DAVID ROTH; Second D i s t r i c t Court Jwdgs And i n i t s REJECTION o f Ths SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
By Judgs ROTH, T h i s Court C i t e d w i t h Approval , TWO PRIOR UTAH SUPRB1S COURT CASES 
AND AS RECENT AS FEBRUARY » . 1995 (LESS THAN 10 Days Ago ) THIS COURT A G A I N 
EXPRESSLY REFUSED TO AUTHORISE THB CIHCTICygN7TQM OF ADDRESSING THE MBKTflT.T.MbUCff 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF THB LABEL OF » FBIVOL0U3> AND THEREBY IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THS 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE' HEARS UNDER THB PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I . SECTION L L 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH VA3 lUCING V1ULATSD CONTRARY TO THE GUARANTEE UF " WU A W O S S U E I* 
f -*t - - PBTTTTON ¥tm Rg-KgABINC - SWART V. MeCOTTEl. D i r e c t o r - QtoOfePI-fU.. ) 
Rel&tire t o the LABEL of * FRIVOLOUS " That was p l a c e * upon the aforesaid HAMSAifc 
PETITION of The Said. BBUC& HATH£«S, This Court aade the f o U o v i n g aforesaid: RULING t 
When t a c e d 
wi_fch a mot ion t o d i s m i s s , t h e c o u r t s h o u l d r e g a r d the"**' "**"™' 
' p e t i t i o n e r ' s a l l e f f F i o n s ^ a s t r u e , deny t h e .motion and p r o c e e d 
i S - d e t e r m i n e j :he f a g t s . J ensen v .TteLancl , No. 870107 (December 
2 9 , 1 9 8 9 ) ; M a r t i n e z v . Smi th . 602 P .2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979 ) . 
(of. MATHEWS V. BARNES. Supra. . In Part Pert inent )(Page 2.) 
The fol lowing WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY appears t o be i n TOTAL HARMONY WITH THE ABOVE 
POSITION OF THIS COURT AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AN& APPEARS TO ADDITIONALLY NOT1 
APPROVE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S AVOIDING THE MERITS WITH MERE REFERENCE TO F O 8 M . . . 
(Al leged NON-COMPLIANCE WITH- - RULE »5B (b) Utah Rules of C i v i l Prooedure ) • 
Such WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY SUBSCRIBE TO THE FOLLOWING POSITION! 
The movant should no* be barred from an apprnprk 
ate re mc:jy_ because he has misstyled his motionVPoe* 
The court should construe it as whichever one is 
^nue r Jjnder_I hT~ circumstances and 3ecUejJ^on its 
merits. For a $ 2255 motion construed as a rule 35 
"motion, see Heflin v. United State*, 358 U.S. 115 
(1950); and United State* v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d 
Cir. 19(>#). For writ of <Tr«r conim .nobis Jxen ted as a 
rule 35 motion, see Hairkin* v. United Glntes, 324 
F.Supp. 223 (F.n.Toxns, Tylrr Division 1971). For a 
rule 35 motion treated as n § 2255 motion, sef Moss v. 
United State*, 2C3 F.2d 015 (5th Cir. 1959! 
GlOmmjSEMTIX, i t would appear That SUBSTANCE ( ALQ1B )ahould be ADDRESSBI . . . 
And NOT F O R M
 # # 0 e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of The AFIAHENT FACT that PRO SB LITIGATION 
WAS BKFORB THB TBIAL COUMT and in such s p e c i f i c regard* The ADTHQRITIBS HAVB TAKEN THB 
FOLLOWING POSITIOHi 
[1,2] We review the complaint under 
the same standards applied in the district 
court. Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 
F.2d 975, 978 (10th-Cir.1986). Because-
plaintiff pursues his claim pro se, wecon-
strue his complajnf liberally. Haines v. 
A"grnpr40TU.S.TT9^ 520-21'," 92~S.CL594? 
595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Collins v. 
Cundy, 603 F.2d 325. 827 (10th Cir.1979). 
A complaint should not be dismissed un-
less, accepdng plaintiffs allegations as 
true, it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff 
can prove no sec ot facts to support the 
claim for relief. Durre v. Uempsey, 869 
'F~2d 543. 545 (10th Cir.1989^ 
ine rexixioner raspecxriuxy suoalts that A LJJ5EKAL QONSTHUCTTON of hla UK) BE 
HABEAS PETITION should hav« resulted in The • EXERCISE OF ONE OF THE CHIEF JUDICIARY 
FUNCTIONS ...That Is ..." THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE TRimt - (BSTBS V. STATE OF TEXAS. 
381 U.S. 532 ( 1965)SEE ALSOt WHITLET V, ALBERS. 475 U.S. 312 ( 198* ) . AND SUCH 
JUDICIAL WOULD HAVE INCLUDED (a) ADDRESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE " 1QUGHING » 
OF WHICH THE PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED AND IMPRISONED FIVE (5) YEARS OR MORS AFHB 
THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL IN CUNTIfflR V. WILKINSON. 679 F.SUPP.. 106* (D. Utah I988) 
- STIPULATEDHTHAT such - 10UCHING was - OVERBROAD - And IMPERMISSIVELY VAGUE nf (b) 
And addressing The FACIAL ABSENCE OF The Utah Constitutional Guarantee of »A UNIFORM 
OPERATION* of The » GENERAL LAWS » under the following provisions off ARTICLE I. SEC. 2k* 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
S^fion 34. (Uniform optr*(loa oMcws.l 
AH U*s of % jtfneitl Datu^'tbtCl b*Tfc.inlform 
ooerttion'. ]tH 
And The Federal Constitutional Guarantee of - EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS - under The 
Fourteenth (l^th. ) Amendment to The UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. THROUS* THE OBVIOUS 
DISPARTY BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING CASES AND THE PETITION'S CASEi 
^h m o v e d h i s U n d away , but he touched her 
a*ain B G. also testified that defendant touched 
her crotch area, c laiming that she "moved it 
away three times, and he kept putting it back 
B G initially thought it was accidental, but 
knew it ,a .s purposeful after the second time, 
l ikewise L.C. testified that defendant put his 
hand do^n in my crotch area, and I moved it 
back and he put it back forcefully, grabbing 
"kind of hard." She also thought it was an 
accident at first, but knew it was deliberate after 
she pushed his hand back and he repeated he 
movement. R.C. testified that defendant pulled 
\WT over and sat her on his lap and while she 
was on his lap he put his hand on her crotch 
a , c a and squeezed R . C . pushed his hand of 
then he put it back a second time. She felt 
"distuibed*" by the incident. 
B I L L I N G S , Pres id ing J u d g e : 
Defendant Richard Perry appeals his 
convictions for one count of gross lewdness, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702 (1990), 
and four counts of lewdness involving a child, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702.5 
(1990), class A misdemeanors . We affirm. 
F A C T S 
Defendant, a fifty-two year-old man, resides 
in Tridell , Utah. For the last fifteen years he has 
acted as Santa Claus at Christmas parties. On 
December 16, 1991, a local church had a 
Christmas party at which defendant was paid to 
act as Santa Claus. Defendant appeared at 8:00 
p .m. to a crowd of several hundied people 
attending the party. After greeting the crowd, he 
sat down in the foyer outside the church ' s 
cultural hall where approximately one hundred 
and fifty children lined up to sit on his lap and 
receive a sack of candy. After about thirty 
minutes, defendant left the church and returned 
home. 
Four girls under the age of fourteen alleged 
that while they were on his lap defendant 
touched their clothed crotch areas with his 
gloved hand. At trial, N . H . testified that while 
on his lap, defendant deliberately grabbed her 
crotch area three t imes, and that she felt 
"violated" and "very uncomfortable." Each time 
T u o other girls testified that defendant 
grabbed their buttocks while they were on his 
lap that evening. First, J .B. , age thirteen, 
testified that Santa rubbed her buttocks area with 
his hand, making her feel "uncomfortable." 
C O . , age fourteen, the sixth girl making 
a l legat ions aga ins t defendant , s imilarly 
complained. She decided to sit on defendant 's 
lap to see if he was a "pervert," as the other 
girls claimed. At trial she testified that defendant 
"grab!- -! ahold of |her l bottom, and I pushed 
his hand away." She testified that the touching 
was not an accident and that it made her feel 
"very uncomfortable and mad." At trial, two 
other children testified that they saw defendant 
touch C.O. ' s buttocks. 
a church leader, a lormer highway pairoiman, 
and fold him about the incidents. Based on 
information he provided, defendant was charged 
with five counts of lewdness in\olving a child, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-9-702.5 
(1990), and one count of gross lewdness, in 
violation of id. §76-9-702, class A 
misdemeanors.1 
After a bench trial, the court found defendant 
guilty on four counts of lewdness involving a 
child, and guilty on one count of gross lewdness 
for the incident involving C O . The court found 
defendant not guilty on one count of lewdness 
involving a child, based on J.B.'s allegation that 
defendant touched her buttocks. 
Defendant filed two post-trial motions. Fust, 
he moved for arrest of judgment and for an 
acquittal, asking the court to set aside its 
judgment. In tins motion, defendant argued that 
i i.dcr State w Vogt, 824 P.2d 455 (Utah App. 
1991), his acts did not constitute lewdness 
m\ oh mg a child, the crime for which he was' 
charged. While this motion was pending, 
defendant filed a motion for arrest of judgment 
or in the alternative for a new trial on the single 
count of gross lewdness. In this motion 
defendant argued that the facts were insufficient 
to support the verdict, it was prejudicial to join 
the charges, and that his legal representation was 
insufficient. 
THUS, it would appear from the above two cases and THE ADDITIONAL GASES CITED IN THE 
PETITIONER'S "MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL w that in addition to The UTAH ATTORNS! GENERAL 
- STIPULATING - that the " T 0 0 C H I N G - ( of The gentilia and other body parts 
under UTAH STATE LEGISLATION RELATIVE THERETO, such jet of " TOUCHING » was "OVERBROAD" 
and * IKPERKISSIBLY VAGUE » ( SEEi CUNTHER V. WILKINSON. Attorney General, 679 F.SUPP.
 f 
1066 /D. Utah 1|68 /) there are NEVERTHELESS TWO (2) DEGREES OF » TOUGHING » (i.e. /l./ 
A GREATER DEGREE captioned " "FORCIBLE "and » AGGRAVATED "AaUSE - made punishable as a 
FELONY while the LESSHt DEGREE OF " T O U C H I N G " is Captioned " LEWDNESS H And 
made punishable a* A MISDEMEANOR. 
However, in such specific regard* The UTAH LEGISLATURE has directed that DOUBT AS TO 
THE DEGREE OF AN OFFENSE should be RESOLVED As directed under the following provisions of 
TITLE 77i Chapter 17> Section I^_ Utah Code annotated 1953 as followsi 
TM7-I, Doubt *J to dtf ire - CcnvJcle/J only on *•' 
lor/rzt, 
- When h appears the.defendant has committed a 
public offense and there is reasonable doubt as to 
which, of,two or% more, decrees he.H. guilty,'he shall 
be convicted only of the lower degree..* i*» 
Therefore consistent with the above provisions of 22£W^Jk£g£ u would appear 
^ 1. - PETITION FOR RE-HEARING - SWART V. McCOTTER, D i r e c t o r ' - 9£bo21-CA - ) 
Fondler S e n t e n c e d : John 
Charles McGreevy, 48, was or-
dered to serve 40 days in jail and 
fined $400 for fondling two girls, 
ages 3 and 5, in June. McGreevy 
was reading a story to the girls at 
a Salt Lake City home when he 
touched their genitals, according 
to police. Charged with two 
counts of second-degree felony 
> sexual abuse of a child, McGreevy 
^pleaded guilty to one count of 
'class^A misdemeanor lewdness 
with a child. In addition to the 
fine and jail sentence, 3rd Circuit 
Court Judge Michael L. Hutch-
ings Thursday placed McGreevy 
on 18 months probation. The 
.judge also ordered him to obtain 
meritai-lJB^^^counseling for hia 
alcohoj problem. 
that DOUBT as to the DEGREE OF " TOUCHING ». should have been resolved as to the 
LESSER DECREE. 
III. 
FINALLY, THE CLEARLY AND SIMPLY STATED PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I . SECTION 1 1 . 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH; APPEAR TO RENDER SUMMARY DISMISSALS FACIALLY 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND FOR SUCH SPECIFIC REASON, THE CAPTIONED COURT SHOULD 
AGAIN RB-AFFIRM ITS JANUARY 2 2 , 1990 FOLLOWING WORDS IN THE MATTER OF THS 
PRO SE APPEAL IN BRUCE MATHEWS V. M. ELDON BARNES. Warden Case No. 890298-CAi 
When j^aced 
wi_th a may_on t o d i s m i s s , t h e c o u r t s h o u l d r e g a r d t"h"e"a*~' 
p e t i r T o n e r ' s ITl'e'gTaFrons~~as t r u e , d e n y t h e j p o t i o n and pr .oceed 
t o d e t e r m i n e t h e £j$£ts • J e n s e n v . DeLand , No. 870107 (December 
->Qt ~~TT»Trr~MarHnez v . S m i t h , 602 P . 2 d 7 0 0 , 702 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) . 
(cf. MATHEWS _y_1_BAR_NE3, Sumra., In Part Pertinent )(Pa^e 2.) 
Relative to the above position of The Captioned:. Court, The Petitioner respectfully 
submits that by requiring the Courts to ADDRESS THE MERITS (Which This Court ALSO 
EXPRESSLY REQUIRED in its RECENT (FEBRUARY fc, I995 ) RULING IN THE CASE OF 
ELMER CANDELARIO V. 0. LAKE McCOTTBR. Director - Case No. 9^0691-CA - wherein The 
following CONCLUDING WORDS OF THE CAPTIONED COURT APPEARS AS FOLLOWS1 
" THEREFORE. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGBMBKB 
DISMISSING THE PETITION IS REVERSED. AND 
THIS MATTER IS REMANDED FOR CONSIDERATION 
OF THE PETITION ON ITS MERITS.* 
c & CANDELARIO V. McCOTTEB. Director.. 
( In Part Pertinent) 
The CANDELARIO (February 6, 1995 ) ruling by This Court would appear to be in 
TOTAL HARMONY with the following provisions of ARTICLE I. SECTION 11. CONSTITUTIOM 
O F U T A f f l S r c * 11. ( C o u r H o p e n — R e d r e s s of i n ju r i e s . I 
— — — - »
 ; \ J J ro111 t.s shal l b*» op*»n, ami every p r i son , for an 
injury done to h im in his person, proper t \ or r e p u t a -
tion. {^1 n11 have remedy by dv.r course of law, which 
shal l be admin i s t e r ed wi thout denia l or unneces sa ry 
d*»lav; and no person shall bo ba r red from prosecu t ing 
or de iendinr ; before nnv t r i buna l in this S l a t e , by 
himself or counsel , any civi! cau.se to which he is a 
pa i ty . ifl^j 
ESPECIALLY THE FOLLOWING ABOVE WORIB OF ARTICLE I t SECTION 1 1 , CONSTITUTION OF UTAH? 
THAT ,.»»~EYBRY PERSON SHALL HAVE REKBIBf BY DUE COURSE OF LAW WHICH SHALL BE ADMINISTERED 
W I T H O U T D E N I A L OR U N N E C E S S A R Y D E L A Y " 
The P e t i t i o n e r r e s p e c t f u l l y submits That the words of the preceding provis ions 
o f ARTICLE I . SECTION 11 . CONSTITUTION OF UTAH' ( S p e c i f i c a l l y these words ) i 
"WITHOUT DENIAL OR UNNECESSARY DELAY * 
would appear t o PRECLUDE (CONSTITUTIONALLY) that SUMMARY DENIALS OF RELIEF (As occurred 
i n the TRIAL COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE) would appear t o be c l e a r l y contrary t o the 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RELIEFi 
" WITHOUT DENIAL * 
(Under the preceding Provis ions of ARTICLE I . SECTION 11 . CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ) 
And would therefore H f J j e f fHB'CfHKnTCRMiRHUr APPROVES NATURE OF THE CAPTIONED 
COURT'S FEBRUARY 6, 1995 * REVERSAL AND REMAND " in the f o r e s t a t e d case of CANDKLARIO 
V. McCOTTER. Supra. , ( A complete eopy Appendixed to the ins tant P e t i t i o n ) • • 
WHEREFORE, The Pe t i t i oner prays that The Captioned Court w i l l determine that the 
fo l lowing
 e 9 e . UTAH ATTORNEY GENERALaS "STIPULAUOI M That The Honorable J. THOMAS 
GREENE,Fate-al Judgo accepted and declared the Provisions r e l a t i n g to * TOUCHING " were 
" OVERBROAD " And UNCONSTITUTIONALLY " IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUS " ( c £ . GUNTHER V.WILKINSON. 
Supra . , ) that i s attached in complete t e x t and desgnated APPENDIX-A And The 
requirement that COURTS ADDRESS THE MERITS- (SEEt e . g . , MATHEWS V. BARNES. Supra.. 
JENSEN V. DeLAND. Supra., MARTINEZ V. SMITH. Supra., And The Feburay 6, 1995 "REVERSAL 
And REMAND " in CANDELARIO V. McCOTTER. Director (Supra., / APPENDIX-!/ ) w i l l s u f f i c e 
t o e f f e c t The Ordering of A RE-HEARING and cause the MERITS of The P e t i t l o n e r f s HABEAS 
PETITION to be ADDRESSED BY THE TRIAL COURT in the i n t e r e s t of a fa i r administration of 
• EVEN-HANDED JUSTICE " . 
Dated t h i s 10th . day of February, 1995. 
Respectful ly Submitted, 
RICHARD'S. SWART, P e t i t i oner 
» « CSRTIFICATB OF MAILING *» 
I , RICHARD S. SWART, do hereby c e r t i f y that an EXACT COPY of The foregoing 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING was placed in The U.S. Mails Postage Pre-paid and addressed tot 
This /Afldbv ** »•>».„.«, looc MS* J A N E T c» GRAHAH, Attorney General 
This / ^ t t a y of February, 1995 ^
 s t a . e Capitol , SLC. OTAHW* 
1 0 G G G79 F E D E R A L S U P P L E M E N T 
proposition tlmt A patent is unenforceable 
if tho patentee refuses to license an appli-
cant when it hns already granted a license 
to the applicant 's competitor. 300 F.Supp. 
656, 661, 161 U.S.P.Q. 527, 537 (N.D.I!!. 
1969). RMI correctly states the holding in 
that case; however, Allied Research con-
tains not a single citation as precedent for 
that position, and it has never been fol-
lowed \n any jurisdiction. More important-
ly, it reaches a conclusion tha t is directly 
opposite tha t reached by its own Seventh 
Circuit Court. In Extractol Process Ltd, v. 
liiram Walker & Sons Inc., 153 F 2d 261, 
268, 63 U.S.P.Q. 128, 131 (7th Cir.1946), the 
Court s ta ted: 
It was clearly within [the patentee 's ] 
right to g r a n t to one party a license to 
make an article, and to sell the same, and 
a license to use the article to another 
party. The patentee is the sole judge of 
the licensee he shall select, to make, to 
sell, or to use his patented article. Pat-
entee 's reasons for selection of its licen-
see are of no concern to o thers . No 
legitimate at tack can be made on the 
patent or pa ten t grant because the pat-
entee chooses A and B as its licensees 
and refuses a license to X, Y, or Z. 
Although Extractol does not cite precedent 
for its holding, it terms "well-settled law" 
the notion tha t the patentee is free to li-
cense in any manner it desires . In the 
absence of fur ther authority to the con-
t rary , this cour t is persuaded to follow 
Extractol and find that 3M's refusal to 
license RMI does not consti tute misconduct 
that would render the '129 unenforceable. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Rased upon its findings, the court con-
cludes the '129 patent is invalid and unen-
forceable on all claims. T)\e Von Berg 
catheter infringed the '129 pa ten t claims 5, 
6 and 7; and the Polaris ca theter infringed 
the '129 pa ten t claims 5 and 6. 
XL ATTORNEY'S F E E S 
[29] Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the court 
may, in exceptional cases, award reason-
able a t torney ' s fees to the prevailing party. 
A showing of inequitable conduct gives rise 
to an award of at torney's fees. See Dott v. 
Four Star Corp., ^07 F.2d 1567, 1 U.S.P.Q. 
2d 1210 (Fed.Cir.1986) (factors that can 
suppor t an award of a t torney fees in patent 
cases are willful infringement, unfairness, 
bad faith, inequitable conduct or fraud, 
vexatious litigation or some similar circum-
stance); see Korody-Colyer, 760 F.2d 1293, 
225 U.S.P.Q. 1099; Stevenson v. Sears, 
Roebuck <£ Co., 713 F.2d 705, 218 U.S.P.Q. 
969 (Fed.Cir.l983)i Tlierefore, based upon 
its finding 3M engaged in inequitable con-
duct, the court awards reasonable attor-
ney's fees to RMI. 
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Kimber ly GUINTHER, Pres iden t , Individ-
ually and in Behalf of the Utah Danc-
er 's Associat ion; Hal ! of Giants Enter-
prises , Inc., dba Dino ' s ; David Maxwell; 
Mini Spas , Inc. dba The E n t e r t a i n m e n t 
Plnce, The Zodiac Hea l th Studio and 
The King's Pa lace ; Greg Bfsseger; 
S h a n n S t rong dba Adams Apple; and 
Heidi Tracy dba Aladdins Geni , Plain-
tiffs, 
T. 
H o n o r a b l e David L. WILKINSON, Attor-
ney General of the S ta te of Utah; State 
of Utah; H o n o r a b l e David Yocum, 
County At torney of Sal t Lake County, 
Utah; Bud Wil loughby, Chief of Police 
of Salt Lake City; The City of South 
Sal t Lake ; and Va! Bess, Chief of Po-
lice of the City of S o u t h Sal t Lake, 
Defendants . 
Civ. No. C87-123G. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, CD. 
Jan . 21, 1988. 
Performing ar t i s t s , dancers, actors, 
and businesses sough t declaratory and in-
junctive relief concerning s ta tu te which de-
GUINTHER v 
Cite • • 679 F Swpp. 
finrd "sexual activity" as used in prostitu-
tion statute to include touching of person's 
clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, 
buttocks, or breasts, whether alone or be* 
tweon members of same or opposite sex. 
Upon stipulation by Attorney General that 
statute was unconstitutional, the District 
Court, J Thomas Greene, J , held that: (1) 
stipulation could be accepted or rejected by 
court; (2) statute was unconstitutionally 
overbroad; and (3) statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Constitutional Law <5^12(2) 
Assurance by state Attorney General 
that he does not intend to enforce law does 
not defeat standing to challenge constitu-
tionality of law by person who realistically 
may be aggrieved by enactment; until 
court acts, apparently invalid or dormant 
statute may become operative, notwith-
standing pattern of apparent lack of en-
forcement, opinion by state Attorney Gen-
eral, or even agreement by Attorney Gen-
eral that act is unconstitutional. 
2. Stipulations S=>3 
Stipulation by state Attorney General 
and challengers of statute which defined 
"sexual activity" as used in prostitution 
statute that statute was unconstitutional 
could be accepted or rejected by court in 
whole or in part, and any declaration or 
ruling as to constitutionality stood as ac-
tion of court independent of any stipulation 
of counsel. 
3. Prostitution <*=>\ 
Statute which defined "sexual activity" 
for purposes of application to prostitution 
statute ssas unconstitutionally overbroad 
and inconsistent with prostitution law it-
self; although prostitution statute applied 
to sexual activity with another person for a 
fee, statute under scrutiny embraced acts 
of touching "whether alone or between 
members of same or opposite sex," which 
was so broad that it conceivably included 
conduct which could not justifiably be regu-
lated. U.C.A.1953, 76-KM301, 76-10-
1302(l)(a). 
WILKINSON 1067 
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1. Prostitution <8=»1 
Prostitution statute which prohibited 
touching of clothed or unclothed genitals, 
buttocks, or breasts for purpose of "appar-
ent or actual sexual stimulation or gratifi-
cation" was unconstitutionally vague; 
without some standard of objective mea-
surement, subjective interpretation would 
be capricious and ordinary act associated 
with performances in dance or theater 
could be subjectively misconstrued. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-10-1301, 76-10-1302(l)(a). 
Steven R. Cook, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
plaintiffs. 
Stanley H. Olsen, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
J. THOMAS GREENE, District 
Judge. 
This matter came on for hearing on Au-
gust 25, 1987, pursuant to defendants' Mo-
tion to Dismiss. Kimberly Guinther, et al. 
("Guinther") was represented by Steven R. 
Cook, and David Wilkinson, et al. ("Wilkin-
son") was represented by Stanley 11. Olsen. 
The parties submitted memoranda and 
presented oral argument The court direct-
ed that any additional memoranda and affi-
davits be submitted by September 15, 1987, 
and that the matter then would be under 
advisement for decision without further ar-
gument unless a written request for fur-
ther oral argument was filed on or before 
September 18, 1987. No further affidavits, 
memoranda or request for oral argument 
were filed. However, on September 16, 
1987, the plaintiff and defendant represent-
atives of the State of Utah filed a stipula-
tion that stated the following: (1) the un-
derlined portion of § 76-10-1301(1) is sev-
erable from the rest of the statute; (2) the 
underlined portion of the statute violates 
the first and fourteenth amendrnenta of the 
United States Constitution; (3) the remain-
ing portion of the Btatute is enforceable; 
and (4) the issue of fees and costs under 42 
US.C. § 1988 (1982) should be reserved, 
although the parties agreed that $2,500 
1 0 0 8 679 F E D E R A L S U P P L E M E N T 
was .1 reasonable award of a t torneys fees. 
Tlio court rnisrd several questions concern-
ing ihn validity of such a stipulation in 
which th*1 Attorney General of Utah agrees 
that an Act of the Utah Legislature should 
be ruled unconstitutional. That ma t t e r and 
other related issues were briefed and 
presented to the court on January 4, 1988. 
The court now being fully advised enters 
its Memorandum Decision and Order . 
BACKGROUND 
In 1087, the Utah State Legis lature 
amended the prostitution section of the 
Utah Code, changing the definition of "sex-
ual activity" as used in that section to 
provide the following* 
"Sexual activity" means acts of mastur-
bation, sexual intercourse, or any touch-
ing of a person's clothed or unclothed 
genitals, pubic area, buttocks, anus, or, 
if the peison is a female, her breast, 
whether alone or between members of 
the same or opposite sex, or between 
humans and animals, in a n art of ap-
parent or actual sexual stimulation or 
gratification. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1) (Supp. 
1987) (emphasis added).' This definition 
applies to an existing section of the Utah 
Code, which in pert inent part provides: 
(1) a person is guilty of prost i tut ion 
whotr 
(a) He engages or offers or ag rees to 
engage in any sexual activity with an-
other person for a fee; 
Id. § 76-10-1302 (1978) (emphasis added). 
On May 6, 1987, this action was filed. 
Plaintiffs consist of performing ar t is ts , 
dancers , actors , businesses, and a prospec-
tive spectator , all of whom claim that the 
1987 amendment infringes their first 
amendmen t r ights , and they seek declarato-
1. On April 8. 1987, the city of South Salt Lake 
pas-ved an identical amendment to its ordi-
nances, which became effective May 5, 1987. 
City of South Salt Like. Utah. Ordinance 202 
(April 8. 1987), to be codified at § 8C-S-5. 
2. Order , November 5. 1987. 
Additional questions addres«^d to counsel u e r e : 
Does the Attorney General's stipulation that 
part of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1) is 
ry and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs named 
Attorney General David L. Wilkinson, Salt 
Lake County Attorney David Yocum, Salt 
Lake City Chief of ,Police Dud Willoughby 
and South Salt Lake City Chief of Police 
Val Bess as defendants in their official 
capacities as the representat ives of the 
s ta te and city responsible for enforcing the 
s ta tu te . 
On May 18, 1987, this court ruled the 
underlined portions t of § 7&-l(M301(l) to 
be severable from the remaining portions 
and that the remaining (not underlined) 
portions are enforceable. The court also 
denied plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order as to enforcement of the 
underlined portion of the s t a tu te because 
defendants made it clear tha t they would 
not a t tempt to enforce tha t portion of the 
s t a tu te with respect to the conduct outlined 
in the Complaint and set forth in Affidavits 
presented by plaintiffs. 
The court will first address certain issues 
raised by the stipulation of unconstitution-
ality presented by the At torney General of 
Utah and other counsel, and then will ad-
dress the merits of the constitutionality of 
the s ta tu te in question. 
I. POWER OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
TO STIPULATE AS TO UNCONSTI-
TUTIONALITY OF STATUTES 
After receipt of the proferred stipulation 
of unconstitutionality concerning the un-
derlined portion of the s t a tu te in question, 
this court sua sponte directed counsel to 
respond to the question: 
Does the Attorney General 's stipulation 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1303(1) is 
unconstitutional exceed the Attorney 
General 's various powers, or violate the 
separation of powers doctrine under the 
Utah Constitution?* 
unenforceable by the state destroy plaintiffs' 
standing in this case, or eliminate this case as 
a "case or controversy" for jurisdictional pur-
poses? 
What effect would this Court's approval of the 
parties' tendered stipulation have on: 
a. The right of plaintiffs to engage In the 
activities they allege are protected? 
b. The rights of third parties to engage In 
such allegedly protected activities? 
( lUJNTHKR v. WILKINSON j n y 9 
C!«« »• 67? F.Stipp. JfV-6 ( D . U t - h I 9 M ) 
It was properly rocognizcd by both coun- In addition to the niithority to bring nn 
xc\ that the stipulation is not r\nd could not action seeking a declaration n«* to the con-
bo binding upon the court, and that only stitutionality of a Utah law, the Attorney 
upon order of the cour t could there be a General presented the proposition to this 
binding declaration of unconsti tutionality. court tha t there is no "prohibition in his 
Utah law seta forth the general duties of acknowledgment of such unconsti tut ional^ 
the Attorney General, and provides in part : ^'" 
It is the duty of the a t torney general : M , 2 ] Recently this court has observed 
(I) to attnnd the Supreme Court of this t h a t m P r e l a c k o f enforcement of a law 
•state, and all court* of the United States , w h , c h h a s b e e n r o S * r < , e d hY the Attorney 
and prosecute or defend all causes to G e n e r a l a 9 unconstitutional is not enough 
which the ntate, or anv officer, board, or * r c n d e r t h « s t a t u < ?
 r
0/ n,° f o r c e , o r f/fect 
. .
 c ., ." , et- - \ Cooper v. Slate of Utah, el a I., slip op. 
commission of the s ta te in an official „„ ' „ „ „ , „ \ „ , ' , „ r ^ x *T 
. , . . r
 fi » . . 87-G-606G December 21, 1987 . Nor can board, or commission of the s ta te in an , . . ' . .
 L 
te. . , . . . . , , .. the assurance by the Attorney General that 
official capacity is a par ty; and has the
 u_ , ^ . ' , , ' , . . „ charge, s attorney, of all civil legal 
matters i?i which the stafe is in anywise 
interested. 
he does not intend to enf rce the law defe
s tanding to challenge the law of a person 
who realistically may be aggr ieved by the 
enactment . Id. Until a cour t acta, an ap-
Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (1986) (emphasis
 p a r e n t ] y j n v a n d or dormant s t a t u t e may be-
added). In Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d
 c o m e operative, notwithstanding a pat tern 
27, .156 P.2d 177 (19G9), the Utah Supreme
 o f a p p a r e n t Jack of enforcement, an opinion 
Court referred to this s t a tu te and said: by the Attorney General, or even, as here, 
This s t a tu t e alone, . . . would provide an an ag reemen t by the Attorney General that 
adequa te basis for the a t torney general the act is unconstitutional. It follows that 
to initiate a declaratory j udgmen t action the stipulation of counsel may be accepted 
whore he believes a s t a tu t e is in direct or rejected by the court, in whole or in part, 
contravent ion to some mandatory provi- and tha t any declaration or ruling as to 
sion of the Constitution of Utah. constitutionality s tands as an action of the 
Id. -156 r 2d at 181. The Hansen court court independent of any stipulation of 
addressed an issue not unlike the question counsel. 
po^od by this court: "Does the Attorney There appears to be no dispute by coun-
General have the r ight to challenge the sel as to the aforesaid principles. Accord-
consti tutionali ty of a s t a tu t e enacted by the ingly, this court now addresses the merits 
Sta te l e g i s l a t u r e . " Id. at 177. The Han- of the s t a tu te in question as to whether it 
sen cour t concluded: passes constitutional muster . 
After consideration of our Constitution, 
s t a tu t e s and decisions of s is ter courts , " • CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
we are of the opinion tha t it is within the T H E STATUTE 
right of the Attorney General, if not his The underlined portion of the Utah stat-
duty to bring suits to clarify the constitu- ute under scrutiny here, excluding the por-
tionality of laws enacted by the Legisla- tion this court has already upheld as en-
ture if he deems it appropr ia te . He is in forceable and not unconstitutional, is as 
a much more informed, duty entrusted, follows: 
and advan tageous position to do so than Sexual activity means . . . any touching 
the individual citizen and taxpayer . of a person's clothed or unclothed geni-
c. The power of prevrnt and future Atfor- State cifed D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examin-
ney General* to enforce Utah Code Ann. trs. 520 P\2d 10, 20-21 (Cal.1974) (attorney gen-
§ 76-10-1.301(1)? erni with common law powers, as representative 
d. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1)? o( the public interest, may concede "constitu-
hi tional facts"). 
3. Orief of Stnte of Utnh M^ Da\id L. Wilkinson 
a! p. 11. In support of this proposition, the 
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PER CURIAM: 
Petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his 
petition for writ, as frivolous on its face. We summarily 
reverse. 
Petitioner challenges his ronviction, following a guilty 
plea, for agaravated arson, and his response to this court's sua 
sponte notion for summary disposition relates entirely to the 
legality and constitutionality of that conviction. However, the 
trial court's dismissal was based solely on its conclusion that 
the petition failed to comply with any of the content 
requirements of Rule 65B(b)(3) through (5), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Satisfact 
law that we re 
trial court's 
1362 (Utah App 
able to determ 
and sentencing 
1993, that the 
post-convictio 
[have not] bee 
ion of the Rule 65B requirements is a question of 
view for correctness, without deference to the 
findings. See Currier v. Holdenr 862 P.2d 1357, 
. 1993). From our review of the petition, we were 
ine where petitioner is restrained, the convicting 
court, that the information was filed in June 
conviction has not been challenged in a prior 
n proceeding, and that f,the issues raised [tjherein 
n previously adjudicated in any other Court." In 
addition, the petition states the basis for the challenge to the 
conviction, which is largely legal rather than factual, and has a 
"supplement" that also sets forth petitioner's claims. 
This court is well aware of the difficulties facing trial 
judges in deciphering largely unintelligible pro se habeas 
petitions, and would not hesitate to affirm the dismissal of a 
petition that truly failed to satisfy the requirements of the 
rules. However, the present petition simply does not present 
such a case. 
Therefore, the trial court's judgment dismissing the 
pe-ciLion is reversed, and this matter is remanded for 
consideration of the petition on its merits. 
&»Ut MIS*-**-' 
Russell W.Bench,Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
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